Marvco Color Research Limited v. Harris and Harris - Contracts - Non est Factum - Signer's Negligence - Failure to Read by Hatherly, Mary
CASE COMMENTS  •  NOTES •  CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 363
Marvco Color Research Limited v. Harris and 
Harris1—Contracts—Non Est Factum—Signer’s 
Negligence—Failure to Read
T he recent decision o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada in M o n ro  Color 
provides a necessary re-exam ination and  clarification o f the C anadian law 
o f non est factum, and f u rth er illustrates a welcome willingness on the part 
o f  the Court to reconsider the status and validity o f prior, controlling 
precedents in this area o f contract law.- T h e  fac ts of M o n ro  Color f urnish 
a classic and striking exam ple o f the problem atic features of the pleas of 
non est factum  within the context o f contem porary contract law and, while 
the decision in the particular case may raise m ore issues than it answers, 
it indicates a radical d ep a rtu re  from  previous authority  concerning the 
effect of a signer's negligence upon the enforceability of a contractual 
docum ent and. to that extent, may serve as a basic conceptual fram ework 
within which a solution to m ore difficult problem s associated with the plea 
of non est factum  may be discovered. T h e  Suprem e Court is therefo re to be 
com m ended for its ef forts to devise a m ore flexible test bv which to assess 
the com peting claims inherent in every instance in which a plea of non est 
factum is raised, in o rd e r to afford  the necessary degree of protection to 
both truly non-consenting contractors and to innocent th ird  parties who 
have acted to their detrim ent in reliance upon an apparently  valid docu­
ment.
Marvco Color Research Limited (the appellant-m ortgagee) initiated an 
action for foreclosure 011 a m ortgage executed bv Mr. and Mrs. Harris (the 
respondent-m ortgagors). T h e  m ortgage, the validity o f which was in issue, 
had been the result o f a protracted  series of financial transactions involving 
Marvco Color, the Harrises and th ree o ther individuals. In January , 1975, 
the m ortgagees sold a business to Johnston  and Suwald, who executed a 
chattel m ortgage in part paym ent. In January , 197b, Suwald decided to 
su rren d er his interest in the business and, in o rd e r to assist Johnston, (a 
friend of the H arrises’ daugh ter, Delia McMullen), the* respondents bor­
rowed $15,000 from  the Bank of M ontreal, which loan was secured bv 
means of a m ortgage 011 their home. Additionally, in January , 1970, Mr. 
and Mrs. H arris executed a second m ortgage which had the effect of func­
tioning as a collateral security to a contrac t of guarantee, previously entered 
into by Mr. H arris and Johnston, in which Marvco Color agreed to abandon 
anv outstanding claims against Suwald arising out of the chattel m ortgage 
of 1975. According to a term  in the collateral security, Mr. and Mrs. Harris 
agreed to assume liability in the event of anv default In Johnston  111 payment 
upon the original chattel m ortgage. Inevitably the- business failed. Johnston
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defaulted, and Marvco Color proceeded against the m ortgagors on the 
basis of the aforem entioned covenant contained in the collateral security. 
T he am ount for which the m ortgagors were potentially liable was $55,
650.43.
As a defence to the action for foreclosure, the m ortgagors advanced 
the plea of non est factum , contending that the m ortgage had been executed 
on the assum ption that the docum ent signed represen ted  only m inor 
am endm ents to the original m ortgage extended by the Bank of M ontreal. 
It was clearly established by the evidence presented at tria l' that the mis­
apprehension as to the na tu re  of the docum ent was the result, not o f any 
actions undertaken  or statem ents m ade by the m ortgagees, but ra ther, of 
representations m ade by Johnston  and  an individual nam ed Clay who were, 
according to the trial judge, “engaged in a m onstrous fraud upon the 
defendants”.4 T he  evidence revealed that the fraud had been perpetrated  
in the following way:
. . . the defendant wife was asked h\ |ohn ston  to have lunch with him and 
her daughter at the Lord Sim coe H otel in I oronto. W hen she arrived  
Johnston said thev were to wait fot Clav who was bringing a paper for hci 
to sign. Clav arrived, said there was an error in the docum ent, left and  
returned and presented the docum ent to the wife. At som e |x>int |ohn ston . 
perhaps in the presence of Clav, said it was |ust to correct the date’ in the 
Bank of Montreal m ortgage. In am  event the defendant w ile signed it 
without lea d in g  it Later that dav Johnston and Clav attended upon het 
husband at hom e and got him to sign as well. I he- husband testified thev 
told him it related to discrepancies in the date of the Bank of Montreal 
m ortgage. He signed without question and without rea d in g .’
At both tlu* trial" and appellate7 levels the m ortgagors successtullv 
resisted foreclosure on the basis of non est factum despite a finding at trial 
that the m ortgagees had been neither parties to the fraud nor had made 
am  representations respecting the legal effect of the docum ent and that
. the defendan ts were c ateless in not reading the doc utnent Ik*tore sign­
ing. I hr wife- is well educated, the husband less so. but both ate  litciate  
and K nglish-speaking and both have a basic uudeistand in g  of m oilgages. 
having exec uted at le ast t lu e e  others since the pun base of the n home."
Notwithstanding tlu* evident intellectual com petence of the m ortgagors, 
tlu* doctrine of non est fat turn v\as determ ined In both the O ntario  High 
( <>ut t and the ( <>m t of Appeal to be applicable owing to the nature of tlu* 
mistake made In the- m ortgagors .is to the* legal significance of the* doc u*
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m ent: . . they were told it was an un im portan t am endm ent to the Bank 
o f M ontreal m ortgage when in reality it was a second substantial m ortgage 
to the plaintiff.”9 With clear reluctance, the trial judge dismissed, as irrel­
evant, argum ents advanced by the m ortgagees in relation to the carelessness 
o f  the signers due to what was perceived to be the controlling effect o f an 
earlier decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada—that o f Prudential Trust 
Co. Ltd. et al. x. Cugnet et a l.'"—in which a majority o f  the C o u rt"  elected 
to adopt the reasoning o f the English C ourt o f Appeal in Carlisle èf Cum­
berland Hanking Co. v. B ragg.'' In general term s, the view advanced in B raggs 
case denied the relevance o f negligence, except in relation to negotiable 
instrum ents, as a factor conditioning the availability o f the defence o f non 
est factum.
However, the decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada, delivered by 
Mr. Justice Estey, reversed the judgm ents o f the two lower courts and held 
that the m ortgagees could successfully m aintain an action for foreclosure. 
In perm itting the m ortgagees to proceed upon the security, the Suprem e 
C ourt ruled that the m ortgagors were to be denied reliance upon non est 
factum. In the opinion o f the court, the m ortgagors were to be precluded 
from  raising an argum ent o f  non est factum  on the basis that “the defendants- 
respondents are barred  by reason o f their carelessness from pleading that 
their m inds did not follow their hands when executing the m ortgage so as 
to plead that the m ortgage is not binding 011 them ."1'
In so confining the operation of the principle of non est factum the 
Suprem e C ourt o f C anada has ef fected a f undam ental break with previous 
au thority", and in expressly approving the decision o f the House of Lords 
in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society' \  has achieved .1 degree of consistency 
between English and C anadian law in this facet of contracts. L 'niformit\ is 
not, of course, in itself a necessarily desirable feature of any judicial de­
cision. However, for the reasons which will be advanced in the rem ainder 
o f this com m ent, the ultim ate result in M arvco Color and the reasoning 
advanced in support o f that result suggest a m ore rational framework for 
the application of the doctrine of non est factum.
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T h e  doctrine of non est factum  operates so as to attack the validity o f a 
contract at the prelim inary level o f  contract form ation, and successful re ­
course to the plea results in a judicial determ ination that the contract is 
void ab initio. T o  the extent that the plea is invoked to defeat a claim for 
the enforcem ent o f a contractual docum ent objectively consented to by the 
signer (as evidenced by the em pirical reality o f actual signature), a judicial 
conclusion favouring the applicability o f  the doctrine results in the avoid­
ance o f the contract on the basis that absence o f a consenting m ind accom­
pany ing  th e  physical act o f  s ig n a tu re  ind icates th a t th e  sig n er “ in 
contem plation o f  law never did sign”."’ Non est (actum is. therefore , a con­
structive denial o f  consent founded  upon a discrepancy between the actual 
intent o f the signer and the provisions of the contractual agreem ent as­
sented to. Non est (actum  will be applied to avoid a contract in circumstances 
in which “the im port of the e rro r  for the interests of the party invoking 
the plea, in the whole actual situation from  which the disputed instrum ent 
arose, placed that party in a position analogous to that of a partv whose 
hand is taken and forced th rough  the motions of signature."17 Since the 
underlying foundation of the plea is lack o f consent, it has generally been 
assumed that the m eans by which consent is obtained are, to a large extent, 
im material: the contract is invalid “. . . not merely on the ground of fraud, 
where fraud  exists, but on the g round that the m ind of the signer did not 
accom pany the signature; in o th er words, that he never in tended to 
sign . . .”.IK T h e  m ethod bv which consent was induced, be it fraud, mis­
representation, duress o r com pulsion, ma\ provide a separate ground lor 
relief ; non est (actum constitutes an independent, consent-based mechanism 
for a declaration of nullitv, designed to afford  relief “to a signer whose 
consent is genuinely lacking’’.1"
However, the scope of non est factum  must accom m odate o ther fun ­
dam ental and often opposing contractual values. Since it may be at least a 
prtma facie inference that actual (in the sense of lion-forged) signature 
connotes volitional consent to contractual term s, and since a successful plea 
o f non est factum  entails the drastic conclusion of nullity, it is evident that 
the operation of the doctrine m ust, for l>oth philosophical and pragm atic 
reasons, in* contained within fairly narrow and  rigid limits. As to the prac­
tical necessity for restrictions upon resort to argum ents founded on non est 
factum, the policv favouring limitation of the doctrine has been expressed 
in a variety of ways. In Waberly v. (lockeral it was stated:
A l t h o u g h  tlu* t r u t h  Ik* th a t  (lit* p la in t  it t is p a id  his m o n e y ,  still n is h e t le t
to su ffer  a m ischief to on e  man than .111 i iK o m em etu c  to many, which
"'Foster \ M urK m non  | IKH9| I. K I ( I’ 701. at 711. pri Bvles |
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would subvert a law; for if  a m atter in writing may be so easily defeated  
and avoided by such surm ise and naked breath, a m atter in writing should  
be o f  no greater authority than a m atter o f  fact.'-’"
More recently, pragm atic argum ents addressed to a circum scription o f the 
availability o f  the plea o f non est factum  were articulated in the following 
m anner:
Much confusion and uncertainty would result in the held of contract and  
elsew here if  a man were perm itted to try to disow n his signature sim ply bv 
asserting that he did not understand that which he had signed.-'
Explicit in such views is a concern to ensure the integrity and stability o f 
comrrtercial transactions which, at least in appearance, are volitional and 
consensual, and on the basis o f  which third parties may acquire rights and 
incur liabilities. Such a statem ent constitutes nothing m ore than a realistic 
appreciation that “the wider the scope we allow to this relief, the greater 
becomes the invasion o f the interests in security o f transactions, putting at 
hazard even the well established cautious procedures of transferees and 
m ortgagees in the checking o f  land titles.’'**
The functional need to extend legal protection to parties who have 
relied on their detrim ent upon docum ents which are “apparently  regular 
and properly executed”23 itself is a pragm atic correlative of a m ore fu n ­
dam ental proposition. It has often been asserted that at least one, if not 
the sole, purpose o f  contract law consists in the protection of reasonable 
expectations.24 T he  requirem ent that expectations, in o rd e r to merit legal 
recognition, be ‘reasonable’entails a corollary: that undisclosed reservations 
and covert assum ptions ought generally to be insufficient to vitiate the 
appearance o f assent, engendered  by signature, on the basis that it is the 
objective m anifestation of consent, ra th er than proof of its subjective ac­
tuality, with which the law is concerned, since that can alone be the source 
and yardstick of the reasonableness o f expectations. T h e  objective theory 
o f contract form ation (to which the principle of non est factum  mav be an
-’" (I542), 1 Over, .r>la q u oted  bv Lstev |. supra. foo tn o te  I. .it .‘<15. 
l tMu.\kh(im Finance Ltd. v. H ow ard. [l9b.S] I ( j  B ‘.Mil. at 9 1 2 . |x-i D onovan  |
**Stonc. supra. footn ote 17. at 217.
'^Supra , foo tn o te  15, at 10211-24. Lord W illierforce
8<See, in this regard , Corbin on Contracts, (St. Paul: W est Publish ing C o.. IW S). esp . sv  I. Ii.it. I!V A ccord ing  
to C orbin, " I be u nd erly in g  p u rp ose  of la* and govern m en t is h um an  happ iness an d  con ten tm en t, to Ik- 
brought about bv the satisfaction  of hum an d esires in d ie  h ighest practicable d eg re e  I hat |x>rtion of 
the h eid  of lavs tfiat is < lassified and des< t ilx-d as th e lavs of contra« Is attem pts the realization of reasonable  
exp ectation s that have been in d u ced  bv the m aking of a prom ise. D oubtless, this is noi the onlv put pose  
bv w tm h m en have been m otivated  in creatin g the lavs of contracts; hui n is lielieved  to Ik- the m am  
u nd erly in g  p urpose, and it is b elieved  that an u n d erstan d in g  of m a in  of th e ex istin g  rules and a d e ter ­
m ination  of their e ffec tiven ess  require a livelv con sciou sness of ib is u nd erly in g p u i|x> se I he lavs d o es  not 
attem pt the realization of every exp ectation  that has Im-c-ii in d u ced  bv a prom ise, the ex|x*ctatiou must Ik- 
a reasonable o n e .”
See also, S W addam s. The L aw  of Contracts. (T o ro n to  C anada l.avs Book L im ited. 1977). particularly 
C hapters 1 and B Reiter and | Svsan ie<K ). Studies in t.on tiac t t.aw , I I oron to  Buitervsorths. I‘.)80). 
particularly S tud ies I, 7 and M
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anom alous exception if applied in an unrestricted fashion) is thus g rounded  
in m ore generalized considerations of fairness. Adhesion to this principle 
has been a consistent them e of contract law and premises the developm ent 
of rules referable to of fer and  acceptance, estoppel, waiver and mistake. 
In short, the conceptual fram ew ork of contract form ation in both its af­
firmative (that is, rules stipulating prerequisites of a valid agreem ent) and 
defensive (that is, rules and doctrines operating to defeat the initial as­
sum ption of'validity generated  by com pliance with formalities) dim ensions 
is. itself, the inevitable product of the objective theory of contract. I his 
point is clearly m ade in. for exam pie, Smith v. Hughes:
“ If, w h a t e v e r  a  m a n ’s rea l  i n t e n t i o n  m a y  be.  h e  so c o n d u c t s  h im se l f  th a t  a 
r e a s o n a b le  m a n  w o u ld  b e l iev e  th a t  h e  w as  a s s e n t in g  to  t h e  t e r m s  p r o p o s e d  
bv t h e  o t h e r  p a r tv ,  a n d  t h a t  o t h e r  p a r t y  u p o n  th a t  belief  e n t e r s  in to  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  w ith  h im .  t h e  m a n  t h u s  c o n d u c t i n g  h im se l f  w o u ld  I k -  e q u a l h  I w h i i h I  
as if h e  h a d  i n t e n d e d  to  a g r e e  t o  t h e  o t h e r ’s t e r m s . - ’
At the same time, the objective theory o f contract form ation alluded 
to above must be qualified. Literal adherance to its tenets might dictate an 
attitude of universal enforceability. T h erefo re , the objective theory has 
been refined so as to perm it limited recognition of rem edial relief in certain 
instances in which the substance of the com plaint consists in p roof of dis­
crepancy between internal intent and the external m anifestations of con­
sent. as is the case in argum ents related to mistake and m isrepresentation. 
Further, the m eans bv which consent is obtained may be* relevant in d e ­
term ining the issue of enforceability, as evidenced by principles concerning 
the effect of fraud, duress, unconscionahilitv and inequality of bargaining 
power. A rgum ents against enforceability prem ised upon these, and anal­
ogous grounds, operate  less as exceptions to the objective theory than as 
elal)orations o f its original premises.
In o rd e r to be acceptable, a rational and intelligible theory of non est 
factum must exhibit consonance with fundam ental contractual values. I hese 
values mav be identified as the necessity for genuine consent and the* need 
to protec t reasonable reliance and reasonable expectations. Sue It interests 
are, in m ain c ases, a coinc ident. A plea of non est factum . however, implic itlv 
indicates an antagonism  (or at least a potential conflict) l>e*tvveen the* nc*c*cl 
to ensure true  consent, on the one hand, and the desire to prom ote the 
intc'gritv of commercial transactions, on the* other. Refusal to permit tlie* 
plea in am  instance could result in the judicial endorsem ent of serious and 
illegitimate invasions of proprietary i n t e r e s t s . I  nlimitc cl availabiliu of the* 
plea would im pair and underm ine the security of contractual relationships 
and thus f rustra te  realization of the b roader goals of c erta in tv , stability and 
predic tability. T h e  objec tive of a theory of non est factum must be* to achieve* 
a com prom ise between thc*se* interests, which would enable a defensible 
selection of the* m ore significant interest in a particular case*. In devising 
such a theory, consideration must be* gi\e*n to the* following i ssi i e*s.  What
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is the natu re  o f the mistake which must be m ade by the signer? What, if 
any, are  the bars precluding resort to the plea? Are these bars absolute or 
discretionary? W hat is the significance o f the interposition o f third-party  
interests?27 C ertain o f  these questions are addressed by the judgm ent o f 
the Suprem e C ourt in M arvco Color in an explicit way. While o ther issues 
rem ain unresolved, it is possible to extrapolate at least tentative conclusions 
as extensions o f the prim ary argum ents advanced in the decision.
The Nature of the Mistake: The Preliminary Inquiry
T o  thesdegree that argum ents found upon non est factum exhibit clear 
affinities with assertions advanced in the context o f the traditional ‘m istake’ 
cases", it is reasonable, at a prelim inary stage, to restrict the scope o f the 
doctrine by reference to the type o r quality o f  the signer’s mistake necessary 
to support the plea. T he  availability o f the plea has, therefore, been con­
tingent upon p ro o f o f a divergence between the inward intent o f the signer 
as to the transaction envisaged and the transaction actually effected bv the 
provisions o f the contractual docum ent. Prior cases”' support the p ropo­
sition that the only mistake classified as operative in the context o f non est 
factum would Ik* one relative to the nature and character of the docum ent 
as opposed to a m isapprehension as to its contents. T he distinction between 
“what the deed actually (as a m atter of detail) contains . . . contrasted with 
what is called its legal character’’’" was. however, repudiated by the House 
of Lords in Saunders on the basis (as explained by Lord Wilberforce) that
T h e  d i s t i n c t io n  . . .  is t e r ip in o lo g ic a l lv  c o n t u s i n g  a n d  in s u b s t a n c e  i l logi­
cal . . .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  it c a n n o t  Ik* r ig h t  th a t  a d o c u m e n t  s h o u ld  he  vo id  
t h r o u g h  a m i s t a k e  as  to  t h e  lal>el n b e a r s ,  h o w e v e r  lit tle th is  m is ta k e  m av  
b e  f u n d a m e n t a l  to  w h a t  t h e  s ig n e r  i n t e n d s ;  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  it is no t  
sa t is fa c to ry  th a t  t h e  d o c u m e n t  s h o u l d  be  valid  it t h e  m is ta k e  is m e re lv  as 
to  w h a t  t h e  d o c u m e n t  c o n ta in s ,  h o w e v e r  r ad ica l  th is  m is ta k e  m av  be  a n d  
h o w e v e r  c a tac ly s m ic  its r e s u l t . 11
In th e c on  text <>t this com m en t. th e term  third p.utv will Ik em p lovcd  to desc nbc anv individual w ho  
is not .1 partv to the orig inal fraud 01 m isrepresentation  indue m g con sen t, w hethei 01 not a p.utv to the  
original (p otentia lly) detec t i \ e  <onli.it 1
I lie m istake cases to  which a pleas of rum esi fa ilum  exh ib its the strongest resem blance w ould Ik- those  
relating to a m istake as to contractual let ms (0 1 . ac c o td m g  to an alter native sc h em e of c lassihc ation . those  
involving unilateral or m utual m istake) such as H a t log l.olin  and  Shields, (1939) 3 All t K 5fifi; Hobbs v. 
h squimault and  Xunuim o Rs l.o  (1899 ). 2 9  S ( K 150. ( otonui! Investment ( .0. v . Borland (1912). b I) L. R 
211 (Alta S ( A pp l)iv ). 1‘aget v M arshall (1884), 28  Ch I) 25'»: Hraokhn Heights Homes v . M a/m  Holdings 
(1*177). 17 ( )  K (2d ) 413  (II ( 1
1 hat the essen ce  of a plea of non est factum  is tou n d ed  upon  a mistake l>v th e  signet is re co g n i/ed  bv 
( airbin. sufrra. fo o tn o te  24. s t>()7 "O ne w ho signs 01 accepts a written instrum ent without reading it with 
c are is likclv to lie sui pi ised  and grieved  .11 its c on ten ts latci on  I he < ase is m alenallv d ille te n t  w hen  
a partv signs 01 accepts a w 1 it ten instrum ent w iihout reading it. th ink ing that he know s its content. II the  
con ten ts a te  not what he sup|>osed. he is assenting under a mistake ot lac I I (us case w ould Ik- dealt with 
|iist as are other cases o l unilateral m istake
■"'Hragg's case, supra, fo o tn o te  12. ap proved  bv the Sup rem e C ourt o l C anada in M m rhau  v Hmse, (1940)
2 I) I..R 2H2. 111 w hich D u ll ( ) ( sta led  at 294 . I lie law is stated 111 the most satisfactory wav in the 
|u d g llien t o l But klev I | in (.arlisle C? ( umber lurid liuriking ( .0. v. Hrugg .
I lie d istinction  i> d iaw n  bv W arrington | 111 H ouatson  v Webb. [1907) I C.h 537. at 549: “t ie  was told  
thev w e ie  d eed s relating to the proper!v to which thev d id 111 la d  relate. His m ind was th erefore  applied  
to the q uestion  o l d ea lin g  w 11I1 that pi o[>ei tv I It* knew he was d ealing  w ith the 1 lass ol d eed  w ith w hu h 
in lac 1 he was d ea ling , but d id not ascertain its con ten ts
Supra, too l note 15. .11 1034-35. fret lo r d  Pearson
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T h e difficulty in d ifferentiating between ‘nature and character’ and 
‘contents’*2, coupled with the obviously arbitrary  nature o f the classification 
and, on occasion, the substantively unfair result entailed by such catego­
rization, has prom pted the abandonm ent o f this test and the substitution 
o f a m ore flexible form ula em phasizing, instead, the materiality o f  the 
mistake m ade by the signer. According to the Saunders case, in o rd e r to 
activate a plea o f non est factum , it is necessary to establish that the discrep­
ancy is ‘radical’, ‘fundam ental’, ‘serious’, ‘very substantial' o r otherwise o f 
such a nature as to ren d er the transaction “entirely o r fundam entally d if­
ferent from that which it was thought to be”** o r such as to go “to the 
substance o f the whole consideration o r to the root o f the m atter.””  Finally, 
the extent o f the discrepancy, in a quantitative sense is, according to this 
test, to be assessed both subjectively and  objectively, taking into consider­
ation the provisions o f the contract in com parison with the ‘belief, ‘object’, 
and ‘understanding’ o f the signing party.*5
Canadian courts have, however, continued to apply the prior char­
acter/contents dichotomy as a m eans o f classifying the nature o f the signer’s 
mistake.*6 T he  nature o f  the discrepancy required  to entitle the signer to 
initiate a plea o f non est factum  was not canvassed in the judgm ent o f the 
Suprem e C ourt in M arvco Color, although the facts o f the case m ight suggest 
that the mistake m ade by the m ortgagors was either as to the natu re  and 
character o f the docum ent, according to the earlier test, or was sufficiently 
material, according to the criteria proposed by the House o f Lords in 
Saunders, to meet the threshold requirem ent o f entitlem ent. It is worth 
noting, however, that Mr. Justice Fstey, although not required  to do so. 
referred  to this aspect o f  Saunders with apparen t approval’7 and in this 
respect, M arvco Color may signal an implicit rejection o f the form er basis 
o f classification. The criteria, described in Saunders, to be applied to de­
b t o r  exam p le . e \e n  in Prudential Trust, \upru. fo o tn o te  2 Cartwright |  d issented  <>n th e (mint o l < I i . i i . h -  
ten /a tto n  o l tin- m istake m ade bv ( a ign et. A ccord ing  to S tone, \upra  loot note 17. at 1**7 ”, . the disunc tion  
fietween class and chaiacter' and contents' o lie r e d  l>\ the case is in the area ol overlap  m eaningless"  
Accord. D enning I. | in (•nllie \ Lee. supra foo tn o te  I .’> at SI-SS. In rejecting this princ ip le o l classification  
as "not a sensible distinction". Lord D en n in g  correctlv p erceived  that the contents o l a d ocu m en t are 
d eterm inative of its class and character and further, that actual d ecisions did not. in fa d . MippMl the 
application of the d istinction
"P e t Lend Keid, w ¡fun. footn ote IV  .H 1011»-17 At a n d .  I o ld  I’earson  al I O S !, |0 S 9
"P e t Lord IIimIsoii. \upra. foo tn o te  15, at I0 IH -I0 I9 : See also the op in ion  of Lord \Vill»ertorcc. wtfna. 
footn ote I h. at 1022 w ho thought the disc repanc v must m ake tfie doc. iim ent "eniirelv or liindainentallv  
d ifferen t trom  that which it was thought to lie
'P e t  l.otcf Pearson, \uprn, foo tn o te  I f>, at I OH I . See also S tone, \upia . lex it note- 17 at 20ti w ho in sum m ari/m g  
the effect of Suunder \ observed "What has now em erged  then , in the u nan im ous view of all the Lords, is 
that the criterion |u siifvm g the' constructive plea is a Iundauiental' o i 'radical d isciepaucv lietw een  what 
the actual effects of d ie  signed  d ocu m en t w ould lie it it w ere allowed to stand and what (lie sign ing partv 
in ten d ed  to bring about bv his sign ature In assessing w h eth e i the d egree  of this discrepancy m eets this 
c i lie i ion all the L oid s also m ade c lear that l fie e l tec ts w ere to Ik- assessed in tc-i ms not merelv of legal but 
also lac uial of>|ec lives I hev me lu d ed  fot exam p le , in this < ase the plaintiff's ob|ec live, in n atu ia l love and  
affection , to help  hei nephew  som ehow  oi otlu-i out of lus financial ci 11 lie ulties
“'See. lo i cxanu^e Hnmeplun Realty I tit v H it him  I 1972). SO D I K (Sell 7 |H (Sask ( j  B I: Pi udential I mo/ 
t n l t d  \ h ir \e tn (  I'tV.li 21 II I R (2d)'"»H7(S( ( I. H ta d ln  v Impel m l Hunk. | I92B| S D I K S M (()S (  l
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term ine the operative natu re  of mistake in the context o f non est factum  are 
highly suggestive o f indicia controlling the disposition o f o ther argum ents 
based upon mistake as to contractual assum ptions.’8 Since the latter have 
been adopted  ra th e r enthusiastically by Canadian courts,™ it is arguable 
that a parallel developm ent in the analysis o f  mistake necessary to support 
a plea o f non est factum  may be anticipated.
Bars to the Availability of the Plea
A mistake either as to the natu re and character o f the docum ent, or 
one which is suf ficiently f undam ental o r essential, is the sine qua non of the 
potential application o f  a plea o f non est factum. Is it, as well, a sufficient 
condition for the availability o f the defence? The decision in M arvco Color, 
like that in Saunders, departs from previous authority  in holding that certain 
species o f conduct on the part o f  the signer may, in an appropria te  case, 
disentitle the non-consenting party to relief. In short, it is clear that while 
the prelim inary requirem ent o f materiality in mistake must be met in o rder 
to establish the possibility o f a non est factum  argum ent, m ere p roo f o f such 
a mistake on the part o f  the signer is no longer conclusive o f the issue. In 
M a n ’co Color itself , it will be recalled, benefit o f the plea was withheld from 
the respondents on the basis that:
. . . the respondents apparently sought to attain som e advantage indirectly 
for their daughter bv assisting Johnston in his com m ercial venture. In the 
Saunders case, supra, the aunt set out to apph her property for the benefit 
of her nephew . In both cases the carelessness took die form  of a failure to 
determ ine the nature of the docum ent ihe respective defendants were ex ­
ecuting. W hether the carelessness stem m ed from  an enthusiasm  for their 
im m ediate purpose or from  a confidence in the intended beneficiary to save 
them  harm less m atters not. This may explain the origin of the careless state 
of m ind but is not a factor lim iting the operation of the principle of tu rn  esI 
factum and its application. I he d efendants, in executing the security without 
the sim ple precaution of ascertaining its nature in fact and in law, have 
nonetheless taken an in tended  and deliberate step in signing the docum ent 
and have caused it to be legally b inding upon themselves.*"
T he concept o f carelessness as a preclusionary device, articulated by 
Mr. Justice Estey, is sufficiently com plex to m erit fu rth e r explication. How­
ever. as a prelim inary m atter, it is necessary to discuss briefly the extent o f 
the break with previous authority  effected bv this ruling, and the rationale 
underly ing consideration of negligence of the signer as a bar to the avail­
ability of non est factum. Prior to the decision in Marvco Color, the governing
"Net- Ini e x a m p le .  t h e  tests e m p lo y e d  in Sottr s HuUher. 1195<)| I k  B ti71 (C.A.). a t p e r  L o r d  D en n in g :  
A <o u t i . t i l  is liable in eqm tv  to  lie set as ide il t h e  par t ies  w ere  u n d e r  a ( o m m o n  m i s a p p r e h e n s io n  
e i ihe i as to l,i< is or .is to  t h e n  rel at ive a n d  re s p e i t iv e  l ights , p r o v id e d  th a t the  m i s a p p r e h e n s io n  was 
f u n d a m e n ta l  and th a t th e  par ty  s eek in g  to  se 11 a s id e  was not himse lf  at fau l t. "  See also  M agee v Pennine
Ins (:„ . | |«M.‘i| L* B '»07 (C.A.).
IIIlisti.illv<- ol llus  11e n d  a l e  »ases  sui h as llx isks  v Smith ( I*.W>‘t), .*> D I R  (3d)  (O n t .  H . C  ); Starwood 
v l .h a i tn  < m h l t.iiifi i I ‘ *7 I i. JO I) I K (,'ld) (N S S I .  A p p  D iv ) ;  Toronto Dominion Hank v. Fortin ft
ill t.\o 2 >  11'*:«.»». SS | ) |  K i Id i 2V2 <B C.S.C.)
"'Sufm i. toot n o te  I. al M l
law in relation to the effect o f  negligence on the part o f  the signer was that 
contained in the earlier decision o f the Suprem e C ourt in Prudential Trust 
Co. Ltd.. This decision represen ted  the im plem entation in Canada o f a 1911 
decision o f the English C ourt o f  Appeal, Bragg's case. T he  cum ulative ef f ect 
o f these decisions, as is well-known, was to deny the relevance o f the signer’s 
negligence as a factor conditioning the availability of a plea o f non est factum , 
except in relation to negotiable instrum ents.
T he  decision, as a m atter o f law, that negligence on the part o f the 
signer was im material to the scope and  operation o f non est factu m . consti­
tuted a reversal o f  earlier authority  which had suggested, with varying 
degrees o f intensity, that carelessness could negative the availability o f the 
defence. T hus, in Foster v. M acKinnon  Byles J. observed:
It seem s plain, on  principle and on authority, that, if a blind m an, or a man 
who cannot read, or w ho for som e reason (not im plying negligence) forbears 
to read, has a written contract talselv read over to him . the reader m isreading  
to such a d egree that the written contract is of a nature altogether d ifferent 
from  the contract pretended  to be read f rom the paper which the blind or 
illiterate man afterwards signs: then, at least if there he no negligence, the  
signature so obtained is of no force." (em phasis added)
T he substance o f the above passage is to dem onstrate clearly that a signer 
o f a docum ent mav be* u n d er a certain (undefined) duty to take reasonable 
precautions in exam ining the contents and determ ining the significance of 
a legal docum ent prior to signature. It is fu rth e r evident that the duty to 
exercise reasonable t are is one im posed not onlv upon those who are com ­
petent (in the sense of being able to read) but also upon those who are 
im paired by e ither blindness or illiteracy. T h e  responsibility with respect 
to the latter class, although not specified by Byles J., may Ix* to ensure that 
the trust reposed in the read er of the docum ent is well-founded.
T he  rejection of the general rule concerning the ef fect o f the signer's 
negligence in Bragg's case, and subsequently in Prudential Trust Co. was 
based upon two contentions. First, it was argued that the decision in Fastei 
v. M acKinnon  was to be confined to the category of negotiable instrum ents, 
in which case the signet of a negotiable instrum ent, with full knowledge 
that the docum ent was a negotiable instrum ent, was to bt* denied the benefit 
o f the plea, irrespec tive of negligence. As to this point, Lord W ilberforce, 
in Saunders. observed:
the judgm ent proceeds on a palpable m isunderstanding <>1 the )udgm ent 
in hnstei \ M acK in n on . foi Hvles | s o  tai from  confin ing the relevance ot 
negligence t<> negotiable instrum ents (as Hragg's ease* suggests), negligence
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''S u fim .  fo o tn o te  l*i .11 712  | k i  Hvles | See  also I hintnight'iiotl \ ( »//■ (l ' iN2).  (.<> R ep  ' la .mil l l iiiilr i s 
W nllrr\ IIH7I).  I K 7 (  h 7 ‘> .it Mli-Kii m  w l in h  Mt-llish I | o h s e tv e d  ' \ i m .  m  m \  o p in io n ,  it is si 111 .1 
d o u b t f u l  q u es t i o n  .it law . o n  w Im li I d o  not wish to  t>i\c .ins dec isive o p in i o n ,  w b e t h e l . it l l ie ie  U  .1 l. ilse 
i c p r e s e n t  ii ion  ies|>ec t in g  th e  c o n t e n t s  ot .1 d e e d .  .1 p e r s o n  w h o  is .111 educ .ited p e r s o n ,  a n d  w h o  m igh t .  b \ 
vetv s im ple  m ean s ,  hav e  s.n ished  h im se lt  as to what  th e  l o u l e n l s  ol th e  d e e d  t e a lb  w ere ,  mav not.  b\ 
ex e cu t in g  11 neg l ig cn t ls  Im e s t o p p e d  as li e lw een him se lf  a n d  a |>eison  w h o  in no ien l lv  a i l s  ci|m>11 th e  t .ulli
ol ilu  d e e d  be in g  valid a n d  w ho  a t i e p l s  an  es ta te  u n d e i  it
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or no neg ligence, and that neg ligence was relevant in relation to docum ents 
other than negotiable instrum ents . . .«*
Secondly, negligence on the part of the signer was dismissed as a 
preclusionary m echanism  in both Bragg's case, and in its C anadian coun­
terpart, Prudential Trust, on the basis suggested by Mr. Justice Locke in 
Prudential Trust:
T o  say that a person may be estopp ed  bv careless conduct when the instru­
m ent is not negotiable, is to assert the existence of som e duty on the part 
o f  the person ow ing to the public at large, or to other persons unknown to 
him who m ight su ffer  dam age by acting upon the instrum ent on the footing  
that it is valid in the hands o f  the holder. I d o  not consider that the authorities 
support the view that there is anv such general duty, the breach of which 
im poses a liability in n eg ligen ce .1'
In o ther words, carelessness in signing an unread  docum ent could only be 
germ ane in those instances in which a clear duty o f care existed on the 
part o f the signer to all those who might ultimately rely upon the validity 
o f the docum ent. The test for the existence o f  such a duty o f care, suggested 
by both Bragg's case and Prudential Trust. was w hether the signer could be 
sued in tort for negligence by the ultim ate holder of the docum ent.
T hat the equation o f negligence as denoting a tortious duty o f care 
(breach of which could give rise to an action in dam aged against the signer), 
and that negligence noted in Foster v. M acKinnon  rested upon a fallacious 
foundation was noted by Mr. Justice C artw right in dissent in Prudential 
Trust:
. . .  in the passages quoted the term [negligence) is . . . used as m eaning that 
lack of reasonable care in statem ent which gives rise to an estoppel. As it 
was put bv Sir William A nson in an article on (Carlisle &  t.umberUnul Banking; 
do. v. B ragg...: 'And further, there seem s som e confusion between the 
negligence which creates a liabilitv in tort, and the luck ot reasonable care 
which gives rise to an estop p el.'“
The im port o t Foster v. M acKinnon  was, therefore, to stipulate carelessness, 
ra ther than negligence in a tortious sense, as a bat precluding application 
of the doctrine of non est factum.
I he substance of Mr. Justice Cartw right's dissent in Prudential Trust. 
concerning the preclusionarv operation of negligence on the part of the 
signer, anticipates the subsequent decisions in -Saunders and M arvco Color
, : Supta. fo o tn o te  l.">. .it 1027. Arcuiti L o r d  P ea rs o n  at 108H. Visionil i  D i lh o rn e  at 1023 a n d  l . o t d  H u d s o n  
at 1019 l o r d  Kent c o n i u i l e d  ill t h e  et te» I o t n e g l ig e n t e  at 101 T*.
11Supra , t o o l n o te  2. at 9 29
**S upta. t o o t n o le  2. at 9!V’> See  also, hi th e  co n tex t  o t co n t t ih u to r v  n e g l ig e rn e ,  t h e  dec is io n  in A Im c/ntn  v 
Mrtryu r ttih fi. 11 H9f* | 2 ( j  B t>40 i( \  i m w hich  l .orci t  sliei M K said:
It is t m e  th a t | t h r  w o i k m a n |  co u ld  no t  hav e  reco v e red  unless , as b e tw e en  biniseli a n d  th e  p la m li t t s .  d ie  
|>l.ti 1111 Its h ad  Ik-cii guiltv ol want ot c a re ;  hu t t h e  p ia nti l i  I s sav th a t,  as I te tween th em se lv es  a n d  the  
d e f e n d a n t ,  thev w ere  not ImiuiicI to  e x a m i n e  th e  < h a m  Im i a u s e  th e  d e f e n d a n t  h a d  w a r r a n t e d  it s o u n d ,  tha t 
thev h a d  a ti gh t to  teiv o n  tha t w a r t a n l v .  a n d  d id  not iclv o n  it. a n d  th e  d e f e n d a n t  c a n n o t  lelv o n  a dutv  
to use d u e  c a re  which  was o w e d ,  not to h im . hut to th e  w o r k m a n . ’'
in relation to this issue. In Saunders, Lords Hodson, Pearson and Wilber- 
force, while d iffering in expression, were in accord in holding that the 
effect o f negligence on the part o f  the signer was to prohibit a successf ul 
resort to the plea o f non est factu m ,45 Limitation o f the benefit o f  the plea 
on this basis was justified on a num ber of grounds. It was felt that to perm it 
a careless signer to raise an argum ent o f non est factum  would be to allow 
an individual ‘to take advantage o f his own wrong'.4" Alternatively, certain 
o f the Law Lords viewed carelessness either as creating an estoppel or as 
operating as the proxim ate cause o f  loss.47 Similarly, in M arvco Color, Mr. 
Justice Estey, rejected the controlling effect o f both B raggs case and P ru­
dential Trust, and denied to the respondents the benefit o f the doctrine, 
reasoning that negligence “precludes the defendants in this circum stance 
from disowning the docum ent, that is to say, from pleading that their minds 
did not follow their respective hands when signing the docum ent and hence 
that no docum ent in law was executed by them "4* since “the respondents, 
by their carelessness, have exposed the innocent appellant to risk o f loss, 
and even though no duty in law was owed by the respondents to the 
appellant to safeguard the appellant from  such loss, nonetheless the law 
must take this discard opportunity  into account.“4'' In electing to apply the 
reasoning o f the House o f Lords in Saunders, and in approving the dis­
senting judgm ent o f Mr. Justice C artw right in Prudential Trust, the Suprem e 
Court has clearly acknowledged the force of the substantial body of aca­
demic criticism which Bragg's case has generated and has endorsed those 
decisions of lower courts such as C. I. B. C. v. Jamestown (.oust. Ltd. ', Royal 
Bank v. Smith''2, Royal Bank v. C h u r c h i l land Bank of X  S. v. Omni Const. 
Ltd. '* in which the benefit of the plea ol non est factum had been withdrawn 
from  negligent signers.
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^'A pproving the- reteren ces supra. foo tn o te  41
"'Supra, (ootnoit* 15», ai 1038 fter Lord Pearson ad op tin g  with approval the op in ion  <>1 Salm on 1 | in (.allii 
v. Lee, supra, foo tn o te  15, .it 48. the e f le it  ol whit h w.is to hold that a person w ho n eg ligen tl\ tails to i cad  
prior to sign ing is haired  Iront the plea ot rum est / m l inn on  the basis that no in.in max take advantage ol 
his ow n w rong
‘"See lot exam p le the op in ion  ot Lord H od son  in Suunders .it |0 |N . supra footn ote I '>. and that ol I <>i<I 
Pearson at 1034.
4".S upra. toot note I. at 31 I
4MIbid
■■"See toi exam p le . Sir \ \  A lison . "( ai lisle and < iim liet land Banking ( o  v B iagg  . I 1912) I’M H > .K  I‘*0 
m which he observed  ShortIv stated, the court w.is .isked to sav which ot iw o i i i i k k c i i I parties would  
suiter to i the traud ot a th ird , and the- Lords |ustices d ecid ed  in lavom  ol the man w hose adm itted  
n eg ligen ce was tin- cause o l the ttou b le  " See also  the com m en ts ot W addam s supra, foo tn o te  '.’ I .il IHI 
185.
M|I982 | 4 V\ U K 299 (Sask (,) B i 
s-< 1980), 74 A P K 40 iNHd I 1> I 
M( 1980), 74 A P R 31 I Mid I D )
’"*1 1 9 8 11 3 V\ V\ K 301 (Sask Q  B .| , See also in this i egai d Hnsal Hunk s \1<i< I ‘bn  11980). II  \  H R  t2d) 
370  (<j.B ); Hunk of M ontreal v I aun ts  I fit L td  (1980). 22 H (..1 K I .V t iS l ) , / n l s  /» < /1 I98t)i. 28 N 11 R 
(2d) 580 i B  ). Hunk »/ \  S v hiresi h Huss i s  Sun I id (1982). to  \  II R 92d ) 5t>3 it j  B i
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T h e  failure to advert to the role o f negligence as a determ inant o f  the 
availability o f the plea o f non est factum , which is characteristic o f decisions 
such as B ragg’s case and Prudential Trust, is justifiable on neither conceptual 
nor pragm atic grounds. Analytically, the denial o f  the relevance o f negli­
gence in earlier decisions appears to proceed from  the initial assum ption 
that, absent a situation in which a reciprocal duty o f care as between the 
signer and the holder o f the docum ent may be discovered, fault is (gen­
erally) im material in contract law.55 This proposition is derived from  the 
theoretically strict natu re  o f contract liability. T h erefo re , it has been argued, 
to exam ine the signer’s conduct and to withdraw the plea in the case o f 
carelessness entails the introduction o f  fault-based considerations which 
are inappropria te  in the context o f  contract law. However, upon closer 
scrutiny, such an assertion appears ill-founded. While contractual liability 
may be strict in the sense that a breach o f contract (irrespective o f the 
m anner in which the breach occurred) is immediately actionable without 
proof o f fu rth er fault on the part of the individual in breach and, in the 
sense that an award o* dam ages in contract is designed to function in a 
com pensatory ra ther than punitive fashion, it is un true  that conduct p e r­
forms no role in determ ining  the creation and  extent of contractual obli­
gations. As Glanville Williams has observed, many doctrines and principles 
of contract law are prem ised upon the ef f ect of the conduct o f  one o r both 
o f the contracting parties:
We need not pause to inquire into the exact verbal mec hanism  In whit h 
a court might introduce the question <>t [contrihutorv] negligence into a 
contract case: w hether in term s of causation, or of im plied dutv on the part 
of the plaintiff to use care in co-operating with the defendan t, or of estoppel 
In negligence, or of the dutv to m itigate dam ages, or of contrihutorv n eg ­
ligence to  nomine: the fact rem ains that whatever the language the subject 
o f enquir\ is whether the negligence of which the plaintiff has concurred  
with that of the defendan t to produce the m isfortune for which dam ages 
are claim ed . .
Negligence, in the sense of carelessness, in the context of a plea of non est 
factum , simply operates to refu te the constructive denial o f consent inherent 
in the defence. In o ther words, carelessness on the part of the signer mav 
indicate a tacit waiver by the signing party of the conventional necessity 
for p roof of genuine consent. If the signet , by his conduct, has dispensed 
with the necessity and opportun ity  to inform  himself of the contents or 
legal significance of the contractual docum ent, he has implicitly assumed 
the risk that he may be mistaken. In such a case, there appears to be* no 
compelling reason to extend to him the legal protection afforded to those 
whose consent is genuinely lacking by reason of innate infirmity , o r whose 
consent has been induced bv fraud, m isrepresentation o r duress on the1 
part of their contractual opposite.
Sec toi .1 d iscussion  o) I ins |>mui|>l< the .im lio i m es l e l e n e d  lo  l>\ \  t I’alm ei and 1’ | Davies in 
"Com nt>uior\ N eg ligen ce  and B reath  o l ( o n iia t i' '(  IMHO) ‘29  Ini & C om p. Law C>iiaiit*rl> t i t
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A rgum ents supporting  restriction of the plea of non e\t factum  in sit­
uations in which the signer's conduct may he characterized as negligent o r 
careless, assum e even greater validity when the careless party attem pts to 
assert lack of true  consent as a grounds for setting aside the contract against 
innocent th ird  parties. T o  the extent that a plea of non est factum  is ana­
lytically and f unctionally aligned to cases of mistake as to contractual terms. " 
judicial refusal to exam ine the ef fect of negligence in the form er categorv 
is theoretically anom alous. As a general rule, in those cases in which one 
part is mistaken as to the m eaning and ef fect of contractual term s, judicial 
attitudes favour an assessment of the significance of the mistake according 
to conventional contract values. In o rd e r to determ ine w hether the mistake 
constitutes a sufficient basis upon which to refuse euforceahilitv, attention 
must be focussed upon the actual understanding  of the mistaken partv as 
to the operation o r m eaning of the contract4and the extent to which am  
m isapprehension was either known to. or induced l>\. the noil-mistaken 
party. This approach is dictated b\ the objective theorx of contract fo r­
mation which is founded upon the “initial proposition that reasonable ex­
pectations are entitled to protection ",M with the result that relief will Ik- 
denied to the m istaken party “when Ins opposite1 has such expectations."v' 
If one accepts, as an original prem ise, that “one who signs a written doc­
um ent cannot com plain if the o th er partx reasonably relies 011 the- signature 
as a m anifestation of assent to the contents, o r ascribes to words he uses 
their reasonable m eaning' '’" judicial denial of ihe plea to careless signet s 
and judicial favouring of the interests of innocent third parties i s  explic able 
and defensible as a m ethod of restricting resort t<> 1 lie* plea and of ensui mg 
the integrity of commercial transactions. In a case in which third parties 
have acquired rights pursuant to <1 contract to which consent 011 the pan 
of the signer was genuinelx lacking, but in which 11 is apparen t that the 
signer was negligent, the issue is ‘whic h, of two innocent parties is t<> suifei 
for the fraud  of a th ird ’. While a careless partx w ill not Ik* <Ii 1 c*c tlx penali/ed 
for negligence which consists, not in the* breach of a legal dtttx owed to 
others, but in a sim ple neglect of his own interests, it i s  ex idem that, in am  
contest between a careless signet and an innocent third partx. the legal 
system must draxv a distinction which is based 011 com parison ol conduct. 
As Mr. Justice Kstex obserxed in M a n ro  (.oho Usell.
. . .  as ImM ween an innocent partv (the appellant) and the ies|>ondents. the 
lav\ must take into account the tad  that tin- appellant was (onipletclv 111 
nocent of am n eg lig en ce .ca re lessn ess0 1 w rongdoing, whereas tin- lespond  
ents b\ their careless conduct have m ade it |>ossihlc foi the w rougd oeis to 
mHict a loss. As between the appellant and the* respondents, sim ple |usii<c 
requires that the partv. who bv the application ol teasonahlr care was 111 a 
position to avoid a loss to am  ot tlu- pai ties. sh<>11 Id l>c-ai am  loss that 1 c siilis 
when the onlx alternative available to the courts would lx' t<> place the- loss
S<-e (list ussion . \u fna . tooinoi«' 
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upon the innocent appellant. . . . The two parties are innocent in the sense  
that they were not guilty of w rong-doing against any other person, but as 
between the two innocent parties there rem ains a distinction significant in 
the law. nam ely that the respondents, by their carelessness, have exposed  
the innocent appellant to risk o f  loss . . .hl.
T h e  purpose of the foregoing discussion has been simply to suggest 
that there  exists no com pelling reason, derived e ither from  principle or 
policy, to reject carelessness when considering the scope of the doctrine of 
non est factum . However, the concept of negligence must be fu rth e r refined 
in o rd e r to determ ine how carelessness will operate  to defeat argum ents 
founded upon non est factum . An analysis of Mr. Justice Estey’s opinion in 
M a n ro  Color reveals, in fact, two alternative bases, both subsum ed within 
the general rubric of conduct, upon which carelessness may preclude the 
availability of the plea of non est (actum: negligence simpliciter and estoppel 
in pais o r estoppel by conduct.
a) Negligence simpliciter
It is clear that Mr. Justice Estev recognized that negligence on the part 
of a signer may, in some circum stances, be sufficient to exclude the o p ­
eration of non est factum. Negligence on the part of the respondents in 
M a n ro  in signing an unread  docum ent certainlv functioned as one reason 
for denial of the benefit of the plea. Underlying the operation of negligence 
in this context appears to be the prem ise that “no one mav take advantage 
of his own wrong"'’- in the sense that negligent contractors ought not to 
Ix* perm itted , bv reliance on the defence of non est factum, to attribute a 
loss to innocent th ird  parties when it is clear on the facts that such loss was 
caused bv the carelessness of the signer.
In acknowledging that negligence mav function .is a distinct and in­
dependent exclusionary device, Mr. Justice Estey appears to have approved 
the sentim ents expressed bv Lord YVilberforce in Saunders to the effect that 
“a person who signs a docum ent, and parts with it so that it mav come into 
o ther hands, has a responsibility, that ot the norm al man of prudence, to 
take care what he signs which, it neglected, prevents him from denying his 
liability un d er the docum ent according to its tenor." '’' In o ther words, while 
negligence in the context ot non est factum  does not entail recognition ot a 
tortious dutv ot care owed to one's contractual opposite, it does involve 
recognition of. at least, a dutv ot care to oneself which mav be described 
as the dutv to ensure that adequate p re tau tions are  taken to inform  oneself
Silf/m  footn ote I. .it HI I-HI.’» Set' alsi> statem ent <>l Xsluusi | in l.iik lm m n i \ \la \o n  (I7K 7). I K t»H 
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as to the tenor of a contractual docum ent. T his responsibility is, according 
to Saunders, one im posed on all signers, including those who suf fer from 
im paired capacities. As explained by Lord W ilberforce, while “there are 
still illiterate o r senile persons who cannot read, o r app rehend , a legal 
docum ent” who may exhibit a prima facie entitlem ent to the plea, if the 
mistake m ade is sufficiently radical, the law “will require even o f  signers 
in this class that they act responsibly and carefully according to their cir­
cumstances in putting  their signature to legal docum ents.”'44 Since “those 
who suf fer from  blindness o r illiteracy o r illness, o r o ther innate incapacity 
have to trust som eone to tell them  what they were signing, and are thus 
misled . . .  it is necessary here that the handicapped party did so trust the 
inform ant and was misled to the degree"'’’ necessary to establish prelim i­
nary entitlem ent. T hat is, while a signer may be incapable for any o f the 
above o r analogous reasons o f “understand ing  at least to the point of 
detecting a fundam ental difference between the actual docum ent and the 
docum ent as the signer believed it to be"'’*’ he o r she is still subject to the 
same responsibility to exercise due care and caution, the degree of which 
will, o f course, depend  upon the particular circumstances. T he  standard  
o f care im posed upon individuals of norm al intelligence and full capacity 
to exercise due care and caution in en tering  into a contractual relationship 
will, correspondingly, be much higher.
While it is clear that any identification ol negligence in the above sense 
with negligence in its tortious aspect has been rejected by both the House 
o f Lords in Saunders and by the Suprem e C ourt of C anada in M an'co ('.(dor, 
it is arguable that the carelessness on the part of the signer of an unread  
docum ent which will negative availability of the defence ol non est factum  
does, in a certain m aterial respect, approxim ate the underlying basis ol the 
tort of negligence. If negligence is to be defined as a breach of a duty of 
care coupled with foreseeability of harm , it does not seem wholly unrealistic 
to regard  the signer of an unread  docum ent as negligent in this sense. 
A lthough “No one signs a docum ent negligently unless in signing he* is in 
breach of a duty o f care to som eone . . . there are  circum stances in w hich 
such a duty of care can Ik * owed to the whole world"'’7. T o  the degree that 
it is both a tacit assum ption in Saunders and an express assertion in Alarvco  
dolor that tht* negligence of the signer consists “in signing what is known 
to be a legal docum ent without finding out what the docum ent is and 
contains"'’8, carelessness may constitute negligence in the* tortious sense 
since “as at the m om ent o f signing the* docum ent might be any kind ol 
legal docum ent, the range of persons who might ac t on it to iheir prejudice
,Alhui .it I02*>
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is correspondingly wide.”**4 T h e  ‘neighbour’ principle underlying Donoghue 
v. Stevenson70 is expressed in sufficiently expansive language so as to impose 
liability on individuals who ought to have foreseen dam age to ‘all persons 
within the range o f those whom he should reasonably have foreseen’ would 
be affected by his actions. Similarly, a careless signer might well be regarded 
as negligent since he o r she ought to have contem plated the possibility that 
individuals m ight suffer detrim ent by acting in reliance on the validity o f 
the contractual docum ent. While Lord W ilberforce in Saunders clearly p re­
ferred  to form ulate this concept in term s o f a ‘responsibility’ to lake care, 
ra ther than as a duty o f care, preclusion o f the defence o f non est factum  
in respect o f careless signers may be a fu rth e r illustration, albeit in an 
attenuated sense, o f the increasing coincidence o f tortious and contractual 
theories o f individual responsibility.
W hatever view one wishes to adopt as to the theoretical operation o f 
negligence in this context—w hether attribution o f loss to the careless signer 
is to be justified on the basis o f  deterrence o r w hether by reference to a 
duty o f care owed to all those who may ultimately relv upon the docum ent— 
it is firmly established that the onus o f p roof in negating negligence rests 
upon the signer and not upon the th ird  party .71
b) Estoppel in Pais
While negligence on the part of the respondents in M a n ro  Color cleark 
form ed one basis for the denial of the benefit of the defense, it is fu rther 
evident that an alternative g round of exclusion was that of estoppel. Ac­
cording to Mr. Justice Kstev. carelessness on the part of the signer assumed 
relevance to the extent that such negligence could give rise to an estoppel 
in favour of the appellant since “the appellant, as it was entitled to do, 
accepted the m ortgage as valid, and adjusted its affairs accordingly. For 
example, the appellant released Suwald from  the chattel m ortgage held In 
the appellant”.7‘ In short, the carelessness of the respondents in signing 
the docum ent had directly occasioned the detrim ent suffered bv the ap ­
pellant who had acted in reliance upon the validitv of the docum ent.
T he possibility that the plea of non est factum might be denied 0 1 1  the 
basis of an estoppel was argued  for bv Lord Denning in Callie \ .  l.ee:
W h e n e v e r  a m a n  o l  full  a g e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d ,  w h o  ca n  r e a d  a n d  w ri te ,  
s igns a legal  d o c u m e n t  w h ic h  is p u t  b e f o r e  h im  for  s i g n a tu r e — b\  w h ich  I 
m e a n  a clot u m e n t  whic h ,  it is a p p a r e n t  011 t h e  face  of it. is i n t e n d e d  to h av e
"'7 bid
'"| I9 VJ1 \  ( d l  l )
Ml th e Law Lords agreed  o il this point in Suundri\. a lthough  with d eg ree  ol p io o l required was not 
spei 1 tied Lord W ilhet Ini t e required (at 101*7) "a tle a l and  sat 1st at toi \ t ase" w Inle at t tilth  ng to Lord Ken I 
(at 1017). the tleg ree  o l proot i eq lin e d  'm usl Ik- lett to the t ourts to d ete i m ine m eat li t ase in light o l all 
the t a i l s '  Russell L | lal t i l .  in th e C ourt o l A ppeal, w ould  h a \e  le q u u etl tn rro fio ia lio ii Im position  
tit the hurden  o l pi oot u|>on the parts i .using mm e\t /n tlum  was |ii<aitied as a tu n  her m ethod  ot restru ting  
the op eration  ot the plea
•Su fna . foo tn o te  1 at <0j
m ) U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U N  B.
legal consequences— then, it he does not take the trouble to read it but signs 
it as it is, relying on the word o f  another as to its character or contents or 
effect, he cannot be heard to say that it is not his docum ent. Bv his conduct 
in signing it he has represented, to all those into whose hands it mav com e, 
that it is his docum ent: and once thev act 011 it as being his docum ent, he 
cannot go  back 011 it. and say that it was a nullity from  the beginn ing.7,1
Kstoppel in this sense refers to the representation generated by signature 
as to the existence o f  consent to the term s o f the contract. While the origin 
of this representation may lie in the signer’s negligence, estoppel is not 
confined to instances of carelessness for, according to Lord Denning “even 
if he was not negligent . . . his conduct in signing will work an estoppel.”7* 
T he essence of the estoppel consists in the conduct (and not merely in the 
carelessness) of the signer, since “to sign what you know to he a legal 
docum ent, relying 011 the word of ano ther as to what are its nature and 
contents, is a standing representation to all into whose hands the docum ent 
innocently comes, that signer has signed that docum ent with whatever 
nature or contents it may have.”7'’
While negligence and estoppel, as limitations upon the availability of 
the plea of non e\t factum, may originate in the same act of careless signing, 
that thev are distinct bars is reflected in the d ifferen t elem ents constituting 
each. Negligence on the part o f the signer denotes a failure to exercise due 
care and diligence in contract form ation, which failure is. looselv speaking, 
culpable. Allegations of carelessness, therefore , emphasize the conduct of 
the signer. Kstoppel. in contrast, concerns itself less with the conduct of 
the signer than with the effect of signature upon th ird  parties. T he tvpe 
of estoppel required  to defeat a plea of non e\t factum is that which is 
necessary to prevent strict insistence upon contractual lights. Kstoppel In 
conduct therefore occurs when “a prom ise was m ade which was intended 
to create legal relations and which to the knowledge of the person making 
the promise, was going to be acted on bv the person to whom it was made, 
and which was in fact so acted on."'" I lie effect of estoppel in cases in 
which non e.st factum is raised as a defence is to preclude the signer from 
denying the- validity of the* objective m anifestation of consent when others 
have acted in reliance upon the contract. In term s of the definitions of 
estoppel, proposed b\ Lord Denning in C.cntral London Property Trust l.td. 
v. High t rees House L td.''. signature to an unread docum ent grounds a 
putative promise of validity to .ill those indiv iduals who are likely to iik in 
detriment in reliance of its genuine nature. “ I he critical |)oint is not whether 
the conduc t is negligence or not. but w hether in the c ii c umstanc es tlie
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conduct implies a false representation  on which the partv claiming estoppel 
has relied to his detrim en t.”78
T h e protection of th ird  party interests requires the developm ent of a 
basis o ther than that of negligence for preclusion o f  the defence of non est 
factum. There will be many instances in which the interests o f th ird  parties 
would be seriously jeopardized if negligence were considered as the sole 
bar to a plea o f non est factum . Several examples may be suggested. There 
may be individuals who can read, yet, because o f limited capacities, are 
incapable o f fully appreciating the legal consequences attaching to the 
docum ent even afte r explanation, and  are thus functionally equivalent to 
those who sign without reading. While one would hesitate to reach a con­
clusion o f  negligence in such circum stances, it is evident that in certain 
situations, the interest in protecting th ird  party rights will outweigh the 
value placed upon true  consent. Similarly, the executive who signs blind' 
a g roup  o f papers presented by his secretary may not. in a strict sense, be 
negligent, since signing ‘blind* is merely one aspect o f the “exigency o f busy 
lives”78. Vet it would seriously im pair the integrity o f commercial transac­
tions were such individuals perm itted  to avoid liability on the basis of non 
est factum. T h e  distinction between negligence as a special basis of preclusion 
and estoppel in pais o r estoppel by conduct as a fu rther limitation on the 
operation o f non est factum  was explicitly articulated by Lord W ilberforce 
who, in Saunders, was careful to d ifferentiate between the two categories:
. . .  a man (annul escape from  the consequences, as regards innocent 
third parties, of signing a docum ent if. I»eing a man of ordinar\ education  
and com petence, fie chooses to sign it without inform ing him self of its 
purport and effect. This principle is  som etim es found expressed in the 
language that he is do in g  som eth ing with lu s  estate . . . but it reall\ reflects 
a rule of com m on sense on the exigent \ of l)iis\ lives.
f hirdlv, there is the case where the signer has been careless, in not 
taking ordinar\ precautions against being deceived . .
Mr. J ustice Kstev was not required  to distinguish between negligence, as a 
bar, and estoppel in the case o f Ala n r o  Color since the factual situation 
clearly supported  denial of the plea on either of the bases suggested. How­
ever, the tenor o f the judgm ent indicates that the Court was p repared  to 
recognize the existence o f both estoppel and negligence as restrictions upon 
the scope o f non est factum . in the sense that the existence o f either would 
serve to defeat the claims o f the careless signer when weighed against the 
expectations of th ird  parties.
c) Operation o f the Bars
While, in o rd e r to plead non est factum  it is im perative to establish a 
sufficient degree of discrepancy between the contract intended and that
■"Stone, ft > a. loot n ote 17. .it 212-21 I
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actually assented to, neither negligence nor estoppel constitute absolute 
bars to the availability o f  relief. In such cases, denial o f  the plea is discre­
tionary only. Application o f the bars as absolute is impossible due to the 
nature o f the conflicting objectives o f the legal system in this area:
Such situations, in m any legal system s, are regulated hv the requirem ent ol 
execution before a notary who, if he is com petent and honest, as he usuallx 
is, can do  m uch to ensu re that the signer understands and intends what he  
is doing. In other system s, such as ours, depend en ce  has to Ik - placed on  
the level of education and prudence of the signer and on the honesty and 
com petence of his professional adviser. But as. inevitably, these controls are 
som etim es im perfect, the law must provide som e m easure of relief. In so 
doing, it has two conflicting objectives: relief to a signer whose* consent is 
genuinely lacking . . and protection to innocent third parties who have 
acted on an apparently regular and properh executed  docum ent. Because  
each of these factors mav involve questions of d egree or shading am  rule 
of law must represent a com prom ise and must allow to the court som e  
flexibility in application."1
Similar sentim ents were expressed by Mr. Justice Estey in M o n ro  dolor:
I wish only to add that the application of the principle that carelessness will 
disentitle a party to the docum ent of the right to disown the docum ent in 
law m ust d ep en d  upon d ie  circum stances of each case. I his has been said 
throughout the judgm ents written on the principle of non e \ l  factum  from  
the earliest tim es. T h e  m agnitude and extent of the carelessness, the tir- 
cum stances which mav have contributed to such carelessness, and all other  
circum stances must Ik* taken into account in each case before a court max 
determ ine w hether estoppel shall arise in the defendant so as to prevent 
the raising o f  this d e fen ce .M-
C onclusion
T he ultim ate result of the decision in M arvco Color is the restoration 
o f clarity to the law concerning the scope and operation of non est factum. 
T h e rejection o f Bragg  \ case and Prudential Trust and the revival, in a 
modified form , o f the principles articulated in Foster v. M acKinnon  indicate 
a willingness on the part o f the C ourt to re-exam ine various aspects of 
contract law to ensure continued consonance between tht* substance of that 
law and contem porary commercial reality. T he  decision also reflects a 
heightened sensitivity on the part o f the Court to the needs and interests 
of third parties, a receptivity to the argum ents of which mav Ik* noted in 
o ther facets of contract law.'"
T he extension of legal protection to sttt ft th ird  parties is «1 consequent e 
of the fairlv rigid fram ework within which the dot trine of non est factum  is 
to operate. Decisions such as Saunders and M arvco Color, in imposing st 1 111-
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gent requirem ents relative to entitlem ent on the part of the signer of a 
docum ent, will no doubt have the effect of confining the plea to fairly 
exceptional circum stances. It now appears that for a constructive denial of 
consent to entail the conclusion o f nullity, a court m ust be satisfied as to 
the following th ree  elem ents. In the first place, the signer must establish a 
divergence between his subjective appreciation o f the in tended operation 
o f the contract and the actual provisions o f the docum ent, which discrep­
ancy is, according to one test, relative to the natu re and character o f the 
docum ent, or, alternatively, ‘fundam ental’ o r ‘radical’.*4 Secondly, a signer 
must additionally establish a lack o f negligence by showing that adequate 
precautions and  due care were exercised in assenting to the term s o f the 
contract. In this respect, failure by literate and experienced contractors to 
apprise themselves o f  the legal significance o f  the docum ent, the validity 
o f which is in dispute, by an exam ination o f its provisions, will, only in an 
exceptional case, not am ount to carelessness sufficient to preclude resort 
to the plea.Hr> Finally, and this assertion can only be tentative, it is arguable 
that, even absent negligence, the principle o f estoppel may be invoked to 
prevent denial o f the validity o f the signature, at least in those cases where 
the requirem ents o f representation  on the part of the signet and d e tri­
m ental reliance on the part o f the opposite are satisfied. As to the form er 
com ponent o f estoppel, it is evident that the signer “will always have m ade 
an un tru e  representation by the act o f signature that the docum ent is his.’’*" 
The operation  o f these desiderata are cum ulative and in conjunction with 
one ano ther have the effect of seriously restricting the operation of non est 
factum.
In light of the inhibiting impact upon recourse to the plea of non est 
factum  achieved by M a n ro  Color and similar decisions, the continued utility 
o f the plea m ust be seriously questioned. Would it not be a m ore sensible, 
logical and practical course to abandon the doctrine altogether? While such 
a proposal was considered and rejected in Saunders on the g round that “to 
elim inate it would . . . deprive the courts of what mav be, doubtless on 
sufficiently ra re  occasions, an instrum ent o f justice’’,*' it is extrem ely d if­
ficult to envisage situations in which application of the doctrine would be 
possible. Clearly, in the conventional two-party situation, in which consent 
is induced by fraud , m isrepresentation o r duress (to cite a few examples), 
contract law already provides adequate vehicles bv which to perm it relief 
to the aggrieved o r m istaken party without the necessity for the preservation
Mln  (his regard, u is word) n otin g  d ia l, al least in C anada, there mav l>e .tit additional requirem ent that 
the m istake m ade l>\ th e sign er l>e in d u ced  h\ a m isrepresentation  l)n t\rh  v h r r h M e r \  O il I n  Ltd . | 1 * Mi"») 
S.t K 670 .
"'’A pp arently . 111 o rd er to raise the plea. 111 addition  to p root ot a suthc lenth  material m istake, on e w ould  
have to n egative n eg ligen ce  and tu rth e i show that, because of the lack of detrim en tal reliance hv th e third  
partv. an estop p el had not a tisen
‘“’S tone, supra, lo o t n ote 17, at 2 IK.
H7Supta. foo tn o te  15 at 1027, f>ri I.ord VVilberforte. W ith re fe ten ce  to this point. l.o rd  Pearson at 10,‘LV 
1037 posited  that the plea m ight l>e available w here the partv d id not intend to sign the docu m en t at all 
and w here the signer was not tec klesslv careless. At the- sam e tim e, h ow ever. I.ord Pearson appeared  also  
to em brace the con cept of estop|>el as a bat
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o f the plea o f non est factum , which in this situation is both redundan t and 
superfluous. In those cases in which the constructive denial o f consent by 
the signer is addressed to rem ote th ird  parties seeking to rely upon the 
docum ent, the argum ents in favour o f abandonm ent o f the defense assume 
even m ore com pelling dim ensions as the argum ents in favour o f protecting 
the non-consenting signer dim inish proportionately. In such cases, the 
interests o f the innocent th ird  parties must inevitably receive priority since, 
as between the signer and the th ird  party, it is the signer who has the 
superior advantage in that he has the initial opportunity  to inform  himself 
as to the nature and contents o f the document.** In electing to forego this 
opportunity , the signer may have been negligent; he will certainly have 
m ade a tacit representation as to validity; and he may fairly be characterized 
as having assum ed the risk that he is mistaken. T o  allocate to a th ird  party 
the risk o f the signer's mistake appears indefensible: the th ird  party has 
neither induced, nor is aware of, the signer’s mistake and is fully entitled 
in such circum stances to rely upon the docum ent. T o  hold otherw ise would 
be to seriously th rea ten  the stability and security o f all commercial trans­
actions. and to defeat the legitim ate expectations of th ird  parties, which 
expectations are. according to the prem ise advanced earlier, reasonabh 
entertained.
MARY HATHKRLY*
'"Simil.ii srn tim riiis  v teic r x i i ir s id l  l>\ I . m d  D r i i im ig .  NI K m / » ¡ n »  \ lm < n .  | | I O l i  l'.*M i( \  i 
n hu . iii j i i  analugous tt in lr x l. s la lrtl. I Irli  il VMuiig ili.il .in in n n « rn l  p u n i i .im i l u l i n  knrw n o t l im g  
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all Ile has ai irti vmiIi i e m p ir li t ut um s|x-t Utili am i m in « ' gì « ni laid i w tiri r a s  il was d ir  sciit i wIn i lei i In 
Itigur liavr d ie g ix ids aliti lliu s rnalilrd  lim i di tin n itili d ir  lia tid
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